

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 019210

64

ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:HFMATTHEWS:CEK

APPROVED BY NEA/EGY:HFMATTHEWS

NEA/ARN:MDRAPER

S/S-O:L MACFARLANE

NEA - MR ABINGTON

----- 039915

O 262205Z JAN 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 019210

STADIS////////////////////

EXDIS

FOL RPT AMMAN 0376 ACTION SECSTATE INFO DAMASCUS 24 JAN.

QUOTE

S E C R E T AMMAN 0376

STADIS

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGSC PFOR JO EG

SUBJECT: TALK WITH KING--EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

REF: AMMAN 0370

SUMMARY: KING QUITE DISTURBED BY EGYPTIAN UNLEASHING  
OF ITS BIG GUNDS AGAINST JORDAN DURING RECENT CAIRO VISIT  
OF HIS TWO EMISSARIES. HE DESCRIBED LETTER SENT BY  
SADAT AND EGYPTIAN INSISTANCE ON ASSIGNING A

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 019210

PREVIOUSLY REJECTED AMBASSADOR TO AMMAN AS SIGNS OF

RAPID DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. HE DISCUSSED EGYPTIAN EFFORT TO TRY TO INDUCE JORDAN TO PARTICIPATE IN A FUTURE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN WHAT HE ASSUMED WAS AN OPERATION TO COVER EGYPT'S FLANK SHOULD DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BE REACHED. HE ALSO SAID SADAT SUGGESTED HE PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA IN AN EFFORT TO GET A FOLLOW-ON DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH HE SAID HE COULD NOT DO WITHOUT GETTING BACK OFF THE WEST BANK AND ARAB JERUSALEM FROM THE ISRAELIS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT POSSIBILITY WAS A NON STARTER. THE KING IS PREPARING A REPLY TO SADAT'S LETTER TO HIM WHICH KING SAID WAS CLEARLY INTIMIDATING AND DESIGNED FOR PUBLICATION. HIS REPLY WILL ALSO BE DESIGNED TO BE PUBLISHED. KING SAYS HE DEEPLY REGRETS PRESENT EGYPTIAN EFFORTS WHICH HE SEES AS DESIGNED TO PUT THE HEAT ON HIM. HE RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, BUT HE IS NOT PREPARED AT THE SAME TIME TO DESTROY HIS IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. HE WAS PROVIDING THIS INFORMATION TO ME FOR THE SECRETARY SO THAT US WOULD KNOW OF HIS EXPECTATION OF ROUGH WEATHER AHEAD WITH EGYPT AND WOULD HAVE HEARD HIS SIDE OF THE QUESTION. END SUMMARY.

1. WHEN I SAW KING JANUARY 24, HE TOLD ME HAD SOME PARTICULARLY BLEAK AND UNREWARDING NEWS ABOUT EGYPT. HE REPEATED PRETTY MUCH WHAT RIFAI HAD TOLD ME (REFTEL) ALTHOUGH FROM AN ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE AND WITH SOME DIFFERENCE IN THE DETAILS. HE BEGAN BY RECOUNTING FOR ME THE FACT THAT EGYPTIANS WERE INSISTING ON ASSIGNING AN INDIVIDUAL AS AMBASSADOR TO AMMAN WHO HAD BEEN ASKED TO LEAVE IN 1970. KING SAID HE HAD ORIGINALLY WRITTEN A QUIET LETTER TO SADAT AND HAS SENT ALONG TAPE RECORDINGS OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUAL MAKING UNFLATTERING COMMENTS ABOUT SADAT HIMSELF. KING INDICATED THAT IN RETURN HE HAD RECEIVED A LONG AND VERY DIFFICULT LETTER FROM SADAT.

2. LETTER HAD AN AIR ABOUT IT OF BEING A DOCUMENT READY FOR PUBLICATION. MAIN THEME WAS THAT WHILE JORDAN HAD IN QUIET SAID IT WAS WORKING FOR EGYPTIAN

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 019210

AND SYRIAN RAPPROCHMENT IN PUBLIC IT HAD TAKEN POSITIONS REGARDING SINAI II AGREEMENT WHICH PITTED IT DIRECTLY AGAINST EGYPT. THE LETTER MADE A NUMBER OF ASSERTIONS ABOUT JORDAN'S STAYING OUT OF THE OCTOBER WAR AND IN SNIDE TERMS SAID IT HOPED NEW JORDANIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA WAS NOT A MATTER OF EXPEDIENCY BUT THAT JORDAN WOULD COME INTO THE NEXT WAR AT THE OUTSET. KING SAID VERY LITTLE OF THE LETTER WAS DEVOTED

TO THE PROBLEM OF THE AMBASSADOR. BUT THE LATTER  
DID SAY THE NEW AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN IN JORDAN TAKING  
INSTRUCTIONS FROM A FORMER PRESIDENT, HAD BEEN A LOYAL SERVANT OF  
EGYPT, AND THAT SADAT WISHED TO HAVE HIM IN AMMAN.  
PRESENT EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN WAS ACCUSED OF IN THE LETTER  
OF HAVING SENT MISLEADING  
REPORTS TO CAIRO AND A STATEMENT WAS MADE THAT  
JORDANIANS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT HIM. KING SAYS AS FAR  
AS JORDAN KNOWS PRESENT AMBASSADOR HAS WORKED HARD AND THEY  
HAVE NEVER COMPLAINED.

3. KING SAYS THAT HE WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSED  
AMBASSADOR AND WILL DO THE DIPLOMATIC THING BY NOT  
ANSWERING THE REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT. HE WILL CONTINUE  
WITH THEM EVEN IF IT MEANS SHUTTING DOWN THE  
EMBASSIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND HE WANTED US TO KNOW  
HIS FEELINGS AND UNDERSTAND WHY THERE MIGHT BE STORMY  
WEATHER AHEAD FOR EGYPT AND JORDAN. HE SAID HE HAD  
GENUINELY HOPED TO PLAY A RESPONSIBLE INTERMEDIARY ROLE.  
I REMINDED HIM OF OUR OWN UNHAPPINESS WITH HIS STATEMENTS  
ON SINAI II. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED NOT TO LEAVE US  
IN ANY DOUBT ABOUT HOW HE FELT AND HAD KEPT QUIET AS  
LONG AS HE FELT HE COULD. MEANWHILE A US MAGAZINE ARTICLE TO  
WHICH SADAT SPECIFICALLY OBJECTED HE FELT CONTAINED SOME MIS  
QUOTATIONS AND LEFT OUT EVERYTHING IN HIS INTERVIEW WHICH HE HAD  
SAID WHICH HAD BEEN COMPLIMENTARY TO EGYPT AND SADAT.

4. KING SAID HE IS NOW COMPELLED TO SEND TO SADAT  
HIS OWN LETTER OBVIOUSLY ALSO PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION WHICH  
WILL TRY TO REFUTE SADAT'S POINTS. HE SAID ALL OF THIS  
VERY UNHAPPILY COULD GET MESSY.

5. CONTINUING ON HE NOTED THAT THE TWO EMISSARIES (RIFAI  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 019210

AND TALHOUNI) HAD BEEN TOLD BY FAHMY NOT  
AS PRIME MINISTER RIFAI CLAIMED SADAT, THAT EGYPT WAS  
READY TO GO TO GENEVA AND WANTED JORDAN THERE WITH IT.  
KING SAID WE ARE NOT GOING TO GO PURELY TO GIVE EGYPT  
COMPANY IN A THIRD STEP ON THE SINAI AND EGYPTIANS KNOW THAT  
THE ONLY POSSIBLE DEAL  
WE CAN ACCEPT IS FULL RETURN OF WEST BANK AND  
JERUSALEM AND THAT IS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN. KING SEEMED  
LESS DISTURBED THAN RIFAI APPEARED TO BE ABOUT THE  
IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT SADAT SAID HE WAS GOING TO DO  
NEXT INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER STEP KING ALSO SAID  
NOTHING ABOUT WHAT SEEMED TO RIFAI TO BE AN EGYPTIAN EFFORT  
SOMEHOW TO INTRODUCE A STRUGGLE BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAELI  
WHICH EGYPT COULD THEN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF. KING WAS  
HOWEVER VERY UPSET BY OBVIOUS SADAT HEAVY PRESSURE ON

JORDAN, INCLUDING THAT KING SAID WAS THE USE  
OF SCANDALOUS LANGUAGE TO HIS EMISSARIES: BY SADAT'S  
INSISTENCE THAT MIDDLE EAST IS NOT BIG ENOUGH FOR  
SADAT AND EGYPT ON THE ONEHAND AND ASAD AND SYRIA  
ON THE OTHER--"ONE OF US HAS TO GO": AND WITH WHAT  
HE TOOK TO BE EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO STIR UP THE FIGHTING  
IN BEIRUT BY THREATENING TO UNLEASH PLO BRIGADE FROM  
EGYPT AND USE OF INFLAMMATORY RADIO BROADCASTS  
ON LEBANON FROM CAIRO. (KING SEEMES TO HAVE FORGOTTEN  
ASAD'S "UNLEASHING" OF SOME PLA TROOPS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO  
RECENT CRISIS:)

6. KING FINALLY CONCLUDED THAT SOMEHOW POSSIBLY BE  
CASUE WE HELD BACK AND TRIED TO ENCOURAGE RAPPROCHEMENT  
BETWEEN EGYPT AND SYRIA, THAT JORDANIAN POSITION APPARED NOW  
TO SADAT TO BE ONE OF WEAKNESS. KING IS OBVIOUSLY UNHAPPY  
AND UPSET BY EGYPTIAN PRESSURE, ALTHOUGH HE SAID"WE HAVE BEEN  
THROUGH THIS BEFORE SADAT SEEMS TO HAVE FORGOTTEN.  
AND WE ARE PREAPRED TO LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES BUT  
WOULD STILL LIKE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WITH BOTH  
EGYPT AND SYRIA IF WE COULD.  
PICKERING

UUNQUOTE KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, VISITS, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 26 JAN 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** saccheem  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE019210  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** HFMATTHEWS:CEK  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760029-0848  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760121/aaaaaryc.tel  
**Line Count:** 192  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** STADIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** STADIS  
**Reference:** 76 AMMAN 370  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** saccheem  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 12 MAY 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <12 MAY 2004 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <14 SEP 2004 by saccheem>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** TALK WITH KING--EGYPTIAN RELATIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, JO, EG  
**To:** CAIRO  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006